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Abstract 
Over time, there have been refinements in the 
way that probability distributions are used for 
representing beliefs. Models which rely on single 
probability distnlnrtions depict a complete 
ordering among the propositions of interest, yet 
human beliefs are sometimes not completely 
ordered. Non-singleton sets of probability 
distributions can represent partially ordered 
beliefs. Convex sets are particularly convenient 
and expressive, but it is known that there are 
reasonable patterns of belief whose faithful 
representation require less restrictive sets. The 
present paper shows that prior ignorance about 
three or more exclusive alternatives and the 
emergence of partially ordered beliefs when 
evidence is obtained defy representation by any 
single set of distributions, but yield to a 
representation based on several sets. The partial 
order is shown to be a partial qualitative 
probability which shares some intuitively 
appealing attributes with probability distributions. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Probability distributions have long been advocated as a 
useful foundation for the modeling of beliefs. The best 
known form of probabilistic belief representation consists 
of a single distribution. Such models bring with them a 
well-developed normative theory of behavior in the face of 
risk (Savage, 1972) which has had many adherents over 
the years. 
Recently, some researchers have concluded that single 
distribution models are too restrictive. Beliefs may not 
always be completely ordered by the believer, even though 
a single probability distnbution necessarily represents them 
as being so. Nevertheless, other attributes of probability 
distributions do seem like accurate portrayals of how 
beliefs behave with respect to Boolean combinations of the 
underlying events, and of how beliefs change in the f8ce of 
evidence. Some of these desirable attributes are peculiar to 
probability distributions. So, to have the attnbutes, a belief 
representation must either use probability distributions or 
else use measures that agree with some probability 
distributions (Snow, 1992). 
One way to get the desirable attributes of probabilities 
without the undesirable restrictiveness of a compJete 
ordering is to model beliefs using non-singleton sets of 
probability distributions. It is often convenient to use 
convex sets of probability distributions, which arise as 
solutions to systems of simultaneous linear inequalities. 
Many natural language expressions of belief are easily 
translated into linear inequality constraints (Nilsson, 
1986), e.g. "This event is at least as likely as that one." 
Linear constraint systems can be revised simply by Bayes' 
formula (Snow, 1991). Although there is a diversity of 
opinion about how set estimates might inform decision 
making, there are useful suggestions for decision rules in 
the literature (for a review, see Sterling and Morren, 
1991). 
As versatile as convex sets are, there are reasonable belief 
patterns that convex sets fail to represent. For example, 
the set of posterior probabilities derived from a convex set 
of priors and a convex set of conditionals is generally not 
convex (White, 1986). Further, some important 
constraints are non-linear. Kyburg and Pittarelli (1992) 
discuss the non-convex sets which arise from the non­
linear assumption of independence between events. 
The present paper explores a circumstance where no single 
set of probability distributions, convex or otherwise, 
faithfully represents a reasonable pattern of belief: namely, 
ignorance being overcome by evidence when there are 
more than two alternatives. By ignorance, we mean that 
the believer is unwilling to · assert any non-trivial prior 
ordering among the sentences of interest. By being 
overcome by evidence, we mean that the believer will 
assert some non-trivial orderings if the contrast between 
the conditional probabilities for the evidence given the 
senten<:es is sufficiently impressive. 
A probabilistic solution to the representation of ignorance 
being overcome by evidence is presented. Although the 
model is more complex than a single set of probability 
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distributions, the orderings that arise have much in 
common with single posterior probability distributions, 
and inference about the orderings is computationally 
inexpensive. 
2. NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
ABOUT IGNORANCE 
In this paper, we sball use the notation 
S >e> T 
to denote the condition that the believer asserts that 
sentence S is, with a warrant satisfactory to the believer, at 
least as belief�worthy as sentence Tin light of evidence e. 
If evidence e does not lead the believer to assert an 
ordering of sentences S and T, then we write 
S ?e?T 
The condition of having no relevant evidence is indicated 
by the particle nil, as in 
S ?nil? T 
which expression denotes that there is no ordering 
between some sentences S and T in the absence of 
evidence. 
We shall assume that the sentences of interest belong to a 
partitioned domain, which is defined as follows; 
Definition. A partitioned domain is a set comprising: 
(i) the always-true sentence, denoted true 
(ii) the always false sentence, denoted false 
(ill) two or more mutually exclusive sentences, called 
atoms 
(iv) well-formed expressions involving atoms, or, and 
parentheses, called simple disjunctions 
(v) well-formed expressions involving simple disjunctions, 
true, false, or, not, and parentheses 
We shall assume throughout that the atoms in the domain 
are collectively exhaustive, that is, one of the atoms is 
true. This additional assumption places little 
epistemological burden on the believer (at worst, it means 
that one of the atoms is "none of the other atoms are 
true"), and has the convenient effect that every sentence in 
the domain has an equivalent simple disjunction. Finally, 
although infinite domains are useful in such applications as 
statistical hypothesis testing, we shall assume throughout 
this paper that the number of atoms in the domain is finite. 
Our first assumptions about ignorance, and the conquest 
of ignorance by evidence express the following ideas. If no 
evidence has yet been observed, and the question of 
relative belief-worthiness is not answerable on logical 
grounds, then there is no satisfactory warrant to order one 
sentence ahead of another. Even after evidence has been 
observed, the question may remain open. Once a 
commitment to an ordering is made, then other 
commitments may be inferred by conditional probability 
considerations. A belief-ordering consistency principle 
discussed by Sugeno ( unpublished dissertation, cited in 
Prade, 1985) obtains regardless of the presence or absence 
of evidence. The formal assumptions are: 
AI. (Lack of explicit non-trivial prior orderings) For any 
sentences S and T, 
S >nit> T implies that T implies S. 
Al. (Lack of implicit non-trivial prior orderings) Values 
for conditional probabilities and orderings among them are 
neither known nor assumed if those values or orderings 
imply non-trivial constraints on the prior probabilities. 
AJ. (Consistency) For all evidence e, including nil, and 
any sentences S and T, 
if T implies S, then S >e> T. 
A4. (Impartiality) If S >e> T, and S' and T' are 
sentences, and S is exclusive ofT , then 
if S' is exclusive of T and p( e I S' ) >= p( e I S ), 
then S' >e> T, and 
if S is exclusive of T' and p( e I T ) >= p( e I T' ), 
then S >e> T'. 
AS. (Recovery from ignorance about atoms) For exclusive 
atoms s and t, and non-nil evidence e, a neceswy 
condition for s >e> t is that p( e I s ) >= p( e I t ), and if 
p( e t s ) > 0, then the inequality is strict. If p( e I s ) > 0, 
then p( e I t ) = 0 is not a necessary condition for s >e> t. 
A6. (Dominance) For any sentences S, T, U and U where 
(S and U) and (T and U) are both false and U implies U, 
and for all evidence e, including nil, 
if ( S or U) >e> (Tor U ), then S >e> T, and 
if ( S >e> T ), then ( S or U ) >e> ( T or U' ). 
3. COMMENTARY ON THE 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Assumption Al explains one circumstance where we 
decline to assert any ordering: when there is no evidence, 
and the one sentence doesn't imply the other. A2 restricts 
the scope of the assumptions to problems whose givens 
rule out no prior probability distribution over the atoms. 
The conditions in assumption A2 reflect the easily-shown 
fact that a disjunctive conditional like p( e I S ) is a convex 
combination of the conditionals for the atoms in S, with 
weights proportional to the prior probabilities of the 
atoms. 
Assumption A3 says that we always assert an ordering 
when one sentence implies another. This is Sugeno's 
consistency requirement. 
Assumption A4 is about non-trivial orderings being 
"evidence driven" and about a different kind of consistency 
in the interpretation of evidence. Suppose S comes to be 
ordered ahead of T on account of evidence e, which is to 
say, not simply on the grounds of logical implication (since 
S and T are exclusive). If the evidence is even more 
favorable to S' than S, or less favorable to T than T, then 
S' >e> T or S >e> T', provided that S' and T or S and T 
have the same simple, exclusive relationship to one 
another that S and T do. 
Assumption A5 establishes some conditions on how 
evidence can elicit belief in an ordering of atoms. The 
assumption requires that there actually be some advantage 
in the evidence (there are difficulties in allowing equal 
evidence strength to elicit ordering, to be discussed later in 
section 1 0), and also that so long as s is not ruled out by 
the evidence, then it could be that s >e> t without the 
evidence ruling t out. The actual decision mechanism to 
assert that s >e> t is deliberately left open. In principle, the 
decision would be based upon on the contrast between 
p( e ] s ) and p( e 1 t ), perhaps founded on a standard of 
"interocular trauma" (in the memorable phrase of von 
Wmterfeld and Edwards, 1986; the contrast "hits the 
believer between the eyes"). One specific decision rule will 
be developed for a particular model of the assumptions to 
be introduced shortly. 
Assumption A6 can be viewed as a specialization of 
dominance notions, such as Savage's (1972) "Sure Thing 
Principle," to the inference, rather than decision, context. 
The assumption says that when comparing disjunctions, 
adding disjuncts to the favored side or removing disjuncts 
from the disfavored side does not disrupt the ordering. 
Nor is the ordering disrupted by adding or removing 
identical disjuncts from each side simultaneously. 
4. ENSEMBLE OF SETS 
REPRESENTATION 
One approach to modeling ignorance might be to say that 
the prior probability distribution over the atoms could be 
any probability distribution whatsoever. That is, we might 
use a set-valued prior estimate, the set of all probability 
distributions. As is typical in such estimates, S would be 
asserted to be no less likely than T when and only when 
p( S ) >= p( T ) for all probability distributions over the 
atoms, that is, when all distributions in the set agree on the 
ordering in question. Call this the unanimous agreement 
rule for representing an ordering by a set of probability 
distributions. 
Although that would surely represent a convincing degree 
of ignorance, it would also be invincible ignorance - no 
evidence short of the revelation of the truth about atoms 
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for certain would ever overcome it. Except in cases where 
T implies S given the evidence (i.e., where there is no atom 
t in T that is not also in S, unless p( e l t ) = 0), we would 
never assert S >e> T in the sense that all our priors revise 
to a distribution where p( S 1 e ) >= p( T I e ). 
The least we could assume to enable vincible ignorance 
under the unanimous agreement rule is that there is some 
atoms whose prior probability is positive. We needn't go 
so far as to assume that aD atoms have a positive prior 
probability in order to decide an ordering question about 
any particular S and T, but we do want to be able answer 
such questions for all S and Tin the domain. 
An ensemble of convex sets provides a way to represent 
ignorance for finite domains where evidence bears upon 
the atoms, and to make that ignorance vincible for all pairs 
of sentences on minimal assumptions for any particular 
pair. An ensemble contains sets of probability 
distributions. For every atom s, the ensemble contains the 
set of probability distributions which satisfy the constraints 
p( s) >=1t 
p( t)>=O 
!.p( ) =1 
for all atoms t besides s 
summation over all atoms 
where 1t is a constant which doesn't depend on s, and 1t is 
both strictly greater than zero and strictly less than one­
half 
If there are N atoms in the domain, then there are N 
vertices for each set in the ensemble. In the set for atom s, 
one vertex has unity for p( s ), and zeros for all other 
atoms' probabilities. All the other vertices have p( s ) = 1t, 
and for one atom t at each vertex, p( t ) = 1 - 1t. All other 
atoms at such a vertex have zero probability. 
The small number of vertices and their simple form make 
the application of Levi's ( 1980) procedure for the revision 
of convex sets (i.e., apply Bayes' formula to each vertex) 
especially easy. At each of the N-1 vertices with two non­
zero elements, the posterior probabilities will be in the 
ratio 
p( sle)/p( t1e) = 1t/(l-1t) * p(e1s)/p( e1t) 
The minimal assumption for deciding the ordering between 
a pair of sentences is expressed in the following criterion. 
An ordering between sentences is asserted in this 
representation just in case that the ordering holds for all 
the probabilities in at least one of the sets in the 
ensemble. Of course, since all the sets are convex, this 
criterion is equivalent to requiring the ordering to bold for 
all the vertices in at least one set. S ?e? T is asserted just in 
case that neither S >e> T nor T >e> S is asserted. We 
shall, of course, take p( tme ) = 1 and p( false ) = 0 in all 
sets, and only sentences which are true or false given the 
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evidence or a priori have a one or zero probability 
everywhere in any set. 
5. DECIDING ORDERINGS IN AN 
ENSEMBLE OF SETS 
To find out whether there is any set in an ensemble where 
p( S I e ) >= p( T I e ) everywhere in the set can be 
accomplished by the foUowing rules , which can be 
considered an implicit representation of the ensemble for 
computational purposes. There is no need for any explicit 
representation of the ensemble, and the only memory 
requirement is for the atoms themselves and the 
conditionals of the evidence. 
'lbeorem 1. For simple disjunctions S and T, the 
foUowing is an effective procedure to decide whether 
S >e>T: 
(1) Eliminate atoms common to S andT, to create S' and 
T', the disjunction of atoms peculiar to S and T, 
respectively (if any) 
(2) If S' and T' are both empty, or if evidence is not nil and 
there is no atom u in S' nor in T' where p( e I u ) > 0, then 
S>e> T. 
(3) If S' alone is empty and either evidence is nil or there is 
an atom t inT' where p( e It)> 0, then not S >e> T. 
(4) 1fT' alone is empty and either evidence is nil or there is 
an atom s inS' where p( e Is)> 0, then S >e> T. 
(5) Otherwise, let s be an atom in S' where p( e I s ) is 
greatest among the atoms in S', and t be an atom in T' 
where p( e I t ) is greatest among the atoms in T'. If 
p( e I s ) I p( e I t ) >= ( 1 - 1t ) I 1t, then S >e> T, 
otherwise not S >e> T. 
Proof. If the evidence is nil, then it is easy to show that 
S >nil> T if and only if T implies S, and the requisite 
ordering is displayed by every probability distribution in 
the ensemble. Rule (1), and either (2) or (3), will apply. 
Suppose, then, that the evidence is not nil. If T implies S 
given the evidence (that is, there is no atom t in T that is 
not also in S, except where p( e I t ) = 0), then every 
probability distribution, and so every set in the ensemble, 
displays the ordering sought. Rule (1), and either (2) or 
(3) will apply. If S implies T given the evidence, and not 
the converse, then no set in the ensemble displays the 
ordering sought. Rules (1) and (4) will apply. 
Suppose that neither S nor T imply the other given the 
evidence. The search for a set where the criterion holds 
can be restricted to the sets for atoms sinS. 
The criterion for S >e> T will fail to hold in any set for an 
atom s which is a disjunct in both non-equivalent 
disjunctions S and T. For S and T to be non-equivalent, 
there nwst be a state t in T that is not in S, and where 
p( e I t )  is not zero. Therefore, in the set for a common 
atom s, there is a vertex where 
p(Sie) lp(Tie)= 
1tp(els) I (1tp(els)+(l- 1t)p(elt)] 
which is strictly less than one. Rule (1) therefore discards 
no potential solution. 
In applying the criterion for S >e> T, the search can be 
restricted to the set corresponding to the atom s inS' with 
the highest conditional evidence probability. If there is 
more than one such atom, then any one will do by the 
symmetry of the ensemble. 
Within the set for that atom, attention can be restricted to 
the one vertex where the prior p( t ) is positive for the 
atom t in T' with the greatest conditional probability given 
the evidence e. At the vertex for t, if 
p(els)lp(elt) >= (l-1t)l1t 
then the posteriors at this vertex are such that 
p(sle)>=p(tle) 
which means at this vertex that p( S I e ) >= p( T I e ), 
since all the other priors are zero. If the order holds at the 
vertex for t, the vertex most favorable toT, then it holds 
at all the others for the set. and if it doesn't, then it doesn't 
hold everywhere in the set. Similarly, if the order doesn't 
hold everywhere in the most favorable set for S, then it 
doesn't hold everywhere in any other set. Rules (I) and (5) 
apply. II 
6. THE ENSEMBLE OF SETS 
FORMALISM IS A MODEL OF THE 
ASSUMPTIONS 
'lbeorem l. The ensemble of sets formalism is consistent 
with assumptions Al-A6. 
Proof. (AI) The restriction on assertions from nil evidence 
is easily verified to hold within each set. 
(A2) The assumption does not constrain the formalism, 
but rather the scope of problems to which the formalism 
may be applied. The restriction that all evidence bears 
directly on the atoms ensures that this constraint on the 
scope of application is respected. 
(A3) Sugeno's consistency is an easily verified property of 
all probability distributions, and hence holds within each 
set. 
(A4) If S >e> T holds, and non-empty T excludes S, then 
the evidence is not nil, and there is some atom s in S and 
not in T, and p( e Is )lp( e It)>= ( 1 -1t )l1t. If p( e I S') 
>= p( e I S ), then it must be that for every atom in S' that 
p( e I atom inS' ) >= p( e I s )  by A2 and the restriction 
that all evidence bears directly on the atoms. Since S' 
excludes T, there is some atom s' in S' that is not in T, and 
so p( e I s' )/p( e I t ) >= ( 1 - 1t )/1t, and so the ordering 
holds in the set for every such s'. The argument for T' is 
similar. 
(AS) If p( e I s ) < p( e I t ), then it is easy to confinn that 
there is no set in the ensemble where p( s I e ) >= p( t I e ) 
at all the vertices. If p( e I s ) = p( e I t ), then because 1t is 
strictly less than one-half, p( s I e ) will be less than 
p( t I e ) at some vertex in each set unless p( e I s ) = 0 .  
Because 1t is strictly positive, p( s I e ) >= p( t I e ) at every 
vertex in the set for atom s for some positive value of 
p( e I t ) whenever p( e I s) > 0. 
(A6) Dominance of this kind is a property of every 
probability distribution. To show that 
S or U' >e> T or U implies S >e> T: there must be some 
set in the ensemble where 
p( S or U' I e ) >= p( T or U I e ) holds for every 
distribution in the set. So, p( S I e ) >= 
p( T I e ) everywhere in that set as well. The argument for 
the other condition is similar./  
7. SOME OTHER PROBABILISTIC 
FORMALISMS WHICH ARE NOT 
MODELS OF THE ASSUMPTIONS 
The ensemble of sets formalism is more complex than 
using either a single probability distribution or else a non­
singleton set of probabilities as an uninfonnative prior to 
represent initial ignorance which is overcome by 
subsequent evidence through Bayes' Formula. Both of 
these simpler structures (under ordinary ways to interpret 
how orderings are expressed) fail to conform to one or 
more of the assumptions Al-A6 in partitioned domains 
with three or more atoms. 
In the case of a single distnbution prior, assuming that 
S >nil> T just in case that p( S ) >= p( T ), then 
assumption AI is violated. Probabilities in a single 
distribution are completely ordered. So, even before any 
evidence is seen, for all sentences S and T, S >nil> T, or 
T >nil> S, or both - not just for sentences where one 
implies the other. 
The same point is often argued on intuitive grounds for the 
Principle of Insufficient Reason when there are three or 
more atoms in the partitioned domain. If p( s ) = p( t ) = 
p( u ), then a priori p( sort)> p( u ). Assumption Al, of 
course, is violated even in dichotomous domains, s-ince if 
p( s ) = p( not s ), then s >nil> not s and not s >nil> s, 
even though neither atom implies the other. 
Any single distribution (not just the PIR distribution) in a 
partitioned domain with three or more distinct atoms (s. t, 
u, ... ) need not conform to assumption A4 (Impartiality). 
Suppose the evidence is such that p( e Is)= p( e It)> 0 .  
Standard results show that p( e I s or t ) is also equal to 
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p( e I s ) regardless of the prior probabilities of s and t. 
Assuming that none of the priors is zero (required by 
assumption AS), then there are values of p( e I u ) and 
p( e I s ) such that 
p(ule)> p( sle) 
but 
p( u I e)< p( sortIe) 
even though the evidence for s or t is no stronger than that 
for s alone. The conclusion that s or t was no less likely 
than u would not be supported by the evidence in such a 
case. 
The situation for set-valued priors is better. Consider the 
set of distributions that solve the N (= number of atoms in 
the domain) simultaneous linear constraints 
p(s)>=c for all atoms s,O<c < l/( 2N-2) [I] 
and total probability, where S >e> T just in case 
p( S I e ) >= p( T I e ) in every probability distribution in 
the solution set. Bayesian revision of [1] can be 
accomplished by applying Bayes formula to the N vertices 
of the solution set, as explained earlier in connection with 
the ensemble of sets formalism. Each vertex has exactly 
two non-zero components. 
Here there is no trivial ordering is asserted on nil evidence. 
It is easy to verify that for any sentences S and T unrelated 
by implication, there is a distribution where p( S ) > p( T ) 
and a distribution where p( S ) < p( T ), so no ordering is 
asserted under the "unanimous agreement" rule. 
In dichotomous domains, the single convex set [ 1] and the 
ensemble of sets where 1t = c are easily shown the be 
equivalent. Any ordering asserted in the one is asserted in 
the other. Dichotomous domains are an important special 
case . For example, much of the plausible reasoning about 
mathematical propositions studied by Polya (1954) 
concerns dichotomous domains. 
With several atoms in a domain, however, there are 
practical problems with the single set. Analysis of the 
vertices of [1] shows that the smallest Bayes Factor 
needed to assert s >e> not s for any atom cannot be less 
than N - 1. This is a nuisance: after all, in a domain with 
100 atoms, many people would experience interocular 
trauma with a much smaller Bayes Factor than 99. The 
dependence of the evidentiary contrast required for 
ordering assertions upon the number of atoms would 
inhibit the application of system [ 1] to large domains. 
In fact, all set-valued priors, including but not limited to 
system [1], can violate the assumptions for some evidence 
when there are three or more atoms in the domain. The 
argument is similar to that made earlier for a single-­
distribution prior in similar domains. Consider the 
distribution in the set most favorable to s compared to u, 
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that is, where p( s ) I p( u ) is greatest. Assumption AS 
requires that none of the priors be zero, so if p( e I s ) = 
p( e I t ) = p( e I s or t ) as before, then there exist 
p( e I u ) and p( e I s) such that 
p( ule) >p(sle) and p(ule)<p( sortle) 
within this distribution. Since this is the distribution most 
favorable to s compared to u, u is asserted to be no less 
likely than s (if the ordering holds here, then it holds 
everywhere in the set), but it is not asserted that u is no 
less likely than sort (since the ordering doesn't hold here, 
it doesn't hold everywhere), even though the evidence is 
no stronger for s or t than for s alone. 
We now return to the ensemble of sets formalism, and 
show that the orderings that it pennits, while not generally 
equivalent to any probability distribution , are nevertheless 
intuitively appealing from a probabilist perspective. 
8. PARTIAL QUALITATIVE 
PROBABILITY 
Definition. A partial qualitative probability is a partial 
order of the sentences in a domain, such that, for all 
evidence e, including nil, and any sentences S, T, and U: 
(i) (boundedness) true >e> SandS >e> false 
(ii) (transitivity) ( S >e> T) and ( T >e> U) implies 
S>e> U 
(iii) (quasi-additivity) if S and U and T and U are 
both false, then 
( S or U) >e> (Tor U) if and only if S >e> T. 
This definition is designed to echo that of an ordinary 
qualitative probability (de Finetti, 193 7). Qualitative 
probabilities abstract some of the ordering properties of 
ordinary probability distributions, and every probability 
distribution is also a qualitative probability. Partial 
qualitative probabilities as defined here differ from 
ordinary qualitative probabilities only in being partial, 
rather than complete, orderings. Partial qualitative 
probabilities can also be shown to display other intuitively 
appealing properties (to a probabilist, at least) beyond 
those used in the definition, such as complementarity: 
S >e> T implies not ( T ) >e> not ( S ) 
9. THE ENSEMBLE OF SETS 
FORMALISM IS A PARTIAL 
QUALITATIVE PROBABILITY 
Lemma. If A, B, C, and D are simple or empty 
(containing no atoms except those where p( e I atom)= 0) 
disjunctions where there is no atom in common between A 
and B, nor any atom in common between C and D, then in 
the ensemble of sets formalism 
A >e> B and C >e> D implies A or C >e> B or D 
Proof. If ( B or D ) implies ( A or C ), then the required 
ordering holds. Suppose that is not the case. If B is empty 
or D is empty, then the lemma is trivial. If A is empty, then 
B is empty, and if C is empty, then D is empty. Suppose 
none of them are empty. For orderings to be asserted, 
evidence must be non-nil. Let a, b, c, and d be the atoms 
such that p( e I atom ) is greatest among atoms in A, B, C, 
and D respectively. WOLG, suppose that p( e I a ) >= 
p( e I c ). Since p( e I c ) I p( e I d ) >= ( 1 - x ) /x, then 
p( e I a ) I p( e l d ) >= ( I - x ) /x, and the inequality 
holds for a and every atom in D. Since x < 1/2 , atoms a 
and d have different p( e I atom )'s, and so they are 
distinct, and a is also distinct from every atom in D; a and 
the atoms of B are distinct by hypothesis, so a is not 
eliminated by step (I) of theorem 1, and the required 
ordering is asserted in the set for a. // 
Theorem 4. The ensemble of sets formalism is a partial 
qualitative probability. 
Proof. It can be shown that any ordering that satisfies 
assumptions A1-A6 is a partial qualitative probability. It is 
also easy to verifY that the special case of the ensemble of 
sets formalism in particular is a partial qualitative 
probability. 
Boundedness: is a property of all probability distributions, 
and so p( true ) >= p( S ) and p( S ) >= p( false ) 
everywhere in all sets in the ensemble, and so the required 
orderings are asserted. 
Quasi-additivity: Quasi-additivity is a property of every 
probability distribution. To show that S or U >e> Tor U 
implies S >e> T: there must be some set in the ensemble 
where p( S or U I e ) >= p( T or U I e ) holds for every 
distribution in the set. So, p( S I e ) >= p( T I e ) 
everywhere in that set as well. The argument for the 
converse is similar. 
Transitivity: Define the following sets: S* = { S and not 
T and not U }, ST = { Sand T and not U }, SU = { S and 
U and not T }, T* = { T and not S and not U }, TU ={ T 
and U and not S }, and U = { U and not S and not T }. 
Some of these sets may be empty, but note that in the 
absence of implications, there must be at least one distinct 
atom on each side of the ">e>" operator in any asserted 
ordering. 
By quasi-additivity, S >e> T if and only if 
S* or S U  >e> T* or TU [2] 
No atom is common to any two sets in [2]. Similarly, 
T >e> U if and only if 
T* or ST >e> U* or SU [3] 
No atom is common to any two sets in [3]. 
To show S >e> U, we show s• or ST >e> U* or TU. 
Applying Lemma 2 to [2] and [3]: 
S* or SU or T* or ST >e> T* or TU or U* or SU 
which, by quasi-additivity, reduces to the desired 
expression. II 
10. A NOTE ON ASSUMPTION AS 
In assumption AS, we required that p( e I s ) be strictly 
greater than p( e I t ) in order for s >e> t to hold. The 
requirement was echoed in the definition of the ensemble 
of sets formalism by the provision that 1t should be strictly 
less than one-half We now present an example where if 
AS called for a weak inequality, the resulting ordering 
would fail to be a partial qualitative probability. 
Suppose there are six distinct atoms in a partitioned 
domain, i through n, and evidence conditionals 
p( e I i) = .6 p( e I k) = .5 
p( e I j) = .4 p( e I I  ) = .6 
p( e I m) = .4 
p( e I n ) = .5 
Consider the disjunctions S = i or j or m, T = k or I or m, 
and U = i or n or k, and suppose that ordering is asserted 
on equal conditionals. S >e> T, since by theorem 1 or the 
quasi-additivity property, we compare i or j (where i has 
the higher conditional, .6) with k or I (where I has the 
higher, also .6). Similarly T >e> U, since we compare I or 
m (1 has the higher, .6) with i or n (i has the higher, again 
.6). If the ordering were a partial qualitative probability, 
then S >e> U, but this is not so. Comparing j or m (both 
have .4) with n or k (both have .5), we fail to assert 
s >e>U. 
It can be shown that this feature is not peculiar to the 
ensemble of sets formalism, but is displayed by any 
ordering that obeys the weakened AS and the other 
assumptions. Note also that the strict inequality 
requirement, which is implemented in the ensemble of sets 
by requiring that 1t be strictly less than one-half, forecloses 
the possibility that for exclusive sentences S and T, 
p( S I e ) >= p( T I e ) everywhere in some set in the 
ensemble, while p( T I e ) >= p( S I e ) everywhere in any 
set in the ensemble. The proof, which is a straightforward 
application ofTheorem 1, especially rule (5), is omitted. 
11. CONCLUSIONS 
In rea] life, beliefs have great subtlety. Although 
probability distributions possess intuitively appealing 
properties that seem to capture some aspects of belief, 
single distributions, convex sets of distributions, and now 
general single sets of probability all fall short of doing 
justice to that subtlety. 
The circumstance studied in this paper where single sets 
fall short, ignorance followed by the advent of partially 
Ignorance 537 
ordered belief, is frequently encountered in important 
practical situations. A more general probabilistic structure, 
the ensemble of sets formalism, appears adequate to model 
beliefs in that circumstance. The orderings that evidence 
elicits within the formalism are intuitively appealing from a 
probabilistic perspective, and the computational effort 
required to decide ordering questions in partitioned 
domains is modest. 
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